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Abstract 
 
Consumer  complaints  affect  company  market  value  and  common  sense  suggests  that  a  negative  impact  is 
expected. However, do complaints always negatively impact company market value? We hypothesize in this 
study that complaints may have a non-linear effect on market value. Positive (e.g. avoiding high costs to solve 
complaints) and negative (e.g. speedy and intense diffusion) tradeoffs may occur given the level of complaints. 
To test our non-linear hypothesis, a panel data was collected from cell phone service providers from 2005 to 
2013. The results supported our tradeoff rationale. Low levels of complaints allow for companies to increase 
market value, while high levels of complaints cause increasing harm to market value. The sample, model and 
period considered in this study, indicates a level of 0.49 complaints per thousand consumers as the threshold for 
a shift in tradeoffs. The effects on market value become increasingly negative when trying to make reductions to 
move below this level, due to negative tradeoffs. 
 
Key  words:  consumer  complaints;  negative  word  of  mouth;  satisfaction;  company  market  value; 
communication. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Managers have closely monitored consumer complaints to further develop marketing programs 
and  manage  customer  dissatisfaction.  Previous  studies  showed  that  dissatisfaction  may  result  in 
negative word of mouth, for instance by people warning friends (Matos & Rossi, 2008; Singh & 
Wilkes, 1996; Trusov, Bucklin, & Pauwels, 2009), or may result in complaints to private or public 
agencies (Singh, 1988). Consumers play a critical role in spreading brand value and affecting the 
efficiency of marketing programs (Kozinets, Valck, Wojnick, & Wilner, 2010). Consumers have also 
gained control over a wide variety of media available to them, including posting opinions online and 
having the option to block unsolicited marketing (De Bruyn & Lilien, 2008).  
In some public service industries, regulatory agencies keep public records of complaints and 
assess  companies’  performance  on  the  basis  of  consumer  complaint  levels.  Public  records  of 
complaints also affect market perception about a company and help disseminate failure of products 
and services by simply describing stories of negative experiences (Luo, 2009; Winchester, Romaniuk, 
&  Bogomolova,  2008).  Very  often  in  a  complaining  context,  the  informant  is  not  necessarily  an 
opinion leader with his/her reputation at stake (Weimann, 1991). Rather, emotions are evident and the 
story of the informant deeply touches listeners (Richins, 1983) in such a way that evoke a good and 
evil battle or a perception of a seriously harmed victim (Laer & Ruyter, 2012). The company then 
becomes vulnerable to the level of complaint that influences the company market value in a direct 
linear fashion (Luo, 2007, 2009) or in a novel, non-linear way.  
We hypothesize in this study that complaints may have a non-linear effect on company market 
value. The hypothesis deals with a company’s ambition to defeat consumer complaint at any cost. We 
actually expect positive and negative tradeoffs between complaint and performance, suggesting that a 
company may have market value increased with low levels of complaints. Once a certain level of 
complaint is displayed, further increase in complaints will sharply reduce company market value. We 
argue  that  positive  tradeoffs  (i.e.  market  value  increase  under  increasing  complaint  levels)  create 
conditions for companies to avoid image decay and save costs by not attending to over-demanding 
consumers and costly problem-solving issues. We also argue that negative tradeoffs (i.e. market value 
decrease under increasing levels of complaints) destroy corporate and brand reputation as well as 
increase the speed and intensity of bad evaluation diffusion.  
Previous studies looked deeply into the behavior and antecedents of complaints (Richins, 1983; 
Singh & Wilkes, 1996), and the direct linear effect on company market value (Chevalier & Mayzlin, 
2006;  Goldenberg,  Libai,  Moldovan,  &  Muller,  2007;  Mittal,  Ross,  &  Baldasare,  1998;  Romani, 
Grappi, & Dalli, 2012). Beyond these previous contributions, our paper contributes to the literature by 
suggesting a non-linear effect of complaints on a company’s market value. Intuitively, it seems evident 
that high levels of complaints are associated with poor financial performance, however, marketing 
research has mainly paid attention to the effects on customer experiences, especially at the customer 
satisfaction levels (Bernhardt, Donthu, & Kennett, 2000; Fornell, Mithas, Morgeson, & Krishnan, 
2006;  Luo  &  Homburg,  2008).  In  addition,  studies  have  focused  more  on  assessing  consumer 
intentions (East, Hammond, & Lomax, 2008) or employee satisfaction (Bernhardt et al., 2000) and 
few have measured companies’ financial performance (see Torres & Tribó, 2011 for one exception).  
There has been a need to establish better metrics to measure how different marketing strategies 
affect  a  company’s  market  value  (Mintz  &  Currim,  2013;  Srinivasan  &  Hanssens,  2009)  and  a 
growing trend has arisen where financial indicators are increasingly being applied to previous studies 
(Anderson, Fornell, & Mazvancheryl, 2004; Fang, Palmatier, & Steenkamp, 2008; Goldenberg et al., 
2007;  Luo  &  Homburg,  2008;  Osinga,  Leeflang,  Srinivasan,  &  Wieringa,  2011).  Lehman  (2004) 
emphasizes that practitioners who want to be involved in the important decisions their businesses 
make  should seek  consistent links  between  strategies  and  financial indicators,  in  particular, those 
related to increasing shareholder value. Studies have used Tobin’s Q Ratio as a parameter to calculate 
a company’s market value and as a metric to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies (e.g. Fang et al., Consumer Complaints and Company Market Value   251 
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2008). Therefore, the aim of our study is to explore the impact of a non-linear effect of complaint on 
company market value as measured by its Tobin’s Q.  
The empirical evidence to test our hypothesis was obtained from panel data collected from 2005 
to 2013, from ANATEL, the regulatory agency that deals with all telecommunication issues in Brazil. 
ANATEL’s website provides monthly data on the number of complaints made to the agency, broken 
down by cell phone service provider, since 2005. Complaints made to a third party agency is critical 
for  a  company’s  performance  because  consumers  may  have  already  complained  directly  to  the 
company and to others (Cronin & Fox, 2010; Ruyter & Brack, 1993). We also collected data from the 
three main publicly quoted cell phone service providers in Brazil. These three cell phone providers 
that compose the data for the empirical test account for 72% of the market and were chosen due to 
their large client base and high number of complaints according to ANATEL records. Over 750,000 
complaints related to these companies have been reported to ANATEL. This industry is also suitable 
for our study because of the highly competitive market and the relatively homogeneous products, 
which  provide  a  context  for  negative  consumer  opinion  to  become  relevant  to  distinguish  one 
company brand from another. This context, resembling a homogeneous oligopoly market structure, 
has  been  theoretically  shown  to  be  an  interesting  setting  to  study  complaint  issues  (Fornell  & 
Wernerfelt,  1988).  Finally,  previous  academic  studies  have  focused  mainly  on  the  Northern 
Hemisphere context, especially the United States (S. W. Brown et al., 2005). Our study also adds to 
the literature by looking at the complaint issue in specific markets and in a developing country. The 
following sections will summarize the theory relevant to this research, the methods used, an analysis 
of the data, and a discussion of our results and conclusions.  
 
 
Consumer Complaint and Company Market Value 
 
 
There  is  a  growing  consensus  that  market  value  better  captures  the  impact  of  consumer 
complaints (Luo, 2009; Luo & Homburg, 2008). Immediately after receiving bad service, consumers 
can, for instance, pass on a negative comment about the service by phone, in person or through online 
social networks (Bentivegna, 2002; Santos & Fernandes, 2011). Consumers tend to make great efforts 
to pass on the details of serious problems (Richins, 1983). Not all word of mouth is equal, and it 
depends on the proximity of the source to those involved, the source’s influence and credibility and 
the characteristics of the network where the word of mouth is occurring (J. J. Brown & Reingen, 
1987). A third party agency’s credentials may further intensify the impact of complaints by simply 
collecting,  sorting,  and  disseminating  the  issues  to  the  general  public  (Ruyter  &  Brack,  1993). 
Depending on the agency’s or consumer’s influence in a given industry, there may be severe damage 
to the company’s reputation and eventually to its sales. Complaints can give the company a chance to 
compensate  for  bad  service  or  recover  a  lost  sale,  once  the  problem  is  properly  identified  and 
consumer trust is redeemed (Santos & Fernandes, 2008).  
A seminal study on the nature of consumer dissatisfaction showed three dimensions by which 
consumers respond to a bad experience with a product or service (Singh, 1988). First, consumers may 
engage in voice response by seeking to redress the problem directly with the company. Consumers 
may want to have the product repaired or other compensation. Second, telling friends and relatives 
about the problem is also regarded as a dimension of customer dissatisfaction response. This negative 
word of mouth creates a remedy arousal that feeds back into future actions. Third, the response may 
also be materialized by filing a formal complaint report with a third party public or private agency. 
Reporting to agencies is considered a voluntary hard action while the other two response dimensions 
are considered easy choices (Singh & Wilkes, 1996). Feick (1987) posited that third-party responses 
are  at  a  higher  hierarchical  level  than  voice  and  private,  negative  word  of  mouth.  Furthermore, 
previous empirical studies have shown that when third-party responses happened it is because any 
kind of voice or negative word of mouth has happened before (Singh & Wilkes, 1996). Agency reports 
are objective and not driven by consumer intention to complain since it captures the actual fact that D. P. Claro, A. F. G. R. Fragoso, S. A. Laban Neto, P. B. de O. Claro  252 
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consumers have formally complained. Therefore, we isolate the third-party influence and focus on the 
impact of public records of complaints to assess the impact on company market value.  
A common mistake made by managers is to not adequately measure financial results of their 
marketing programs, which undermines their overall company credibility (Mintz & Currim, 2013; 
Rust, Lemon, & Zeithmal, 2004). There is a relationship between customer satisfaction and generating 
shareholder value, which underlines the relevance of market value (Anderson et al., 2004; Gruca & 
Rego, 2005; Luo & Homburg, 2008). Several studies seek to establish empirical evidence about the 
impact of marketing activity on company financial indicators (e.g. Anderson et al., 2004; Sorescu & 
Spanjol,  2008).  The  underlying  logic  considers  that  customer  satisfaction  positively  influences  a 
company’s ability to retain them, and this guarantees future revenue and reduces the cost of future 
transactions, such as investments in advertising, services and sales (Anderson et al., 2004). 
One of the ways to evaluate the impact of marketing strategies on company market value is to 
use  Tobin’s  Q  Ratio.  This  is  an  index  based  on  share  values,  which  presents  advantages  over 
traditional financial indices such as Return on Assets or Return on Net Capital (Fama, 1970). The 
Tobin’s Q, based on the theory of efficient market prices, reflects all available relevant information 
including projected future cash flow adjusted for risk, and reflecting a company’s intangible assets, 
which cannot easily be measured by accounting figures (Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998). The Q 
ratio  is  used  to  compare  companies  in  different  industries,  because  it  is  not  affected  by  specific 
accounting conventions (Chakravarthy, 1986).  
 
 
The Non-Linear Effect of Complaints 
 
 
Previous literature and evidence indicates that complaints reduce company performance, though 
we argue that the level of complaints present an inverted U-shape effect on performance. Luo (2007) 
suggests that achieving 100% customer satisfaction is not a very realistic scenario and is rarely viable. 
There may be diminishing returns in efforts to satisfy customers (Dixon, Freeman, & Toman, 2010). 
An increase in complaint level can reduce company market value, however not necessarily every time. 
This is because the cost, time, quality, technological restrictions and customer satisfaction establish 
limits as to what can be achieved, making it necessary for managers to make choices as tradeoffs 
emerge (Skinner, 1969). The tradeoff concept requires that companies, when working close to the 
limit  of  their  resources,  make  choices  between  their  competitive  priorities.  We  therefore  expect 
positive and negative tradeoffs regarding complaint level effect on market value (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Model of the Non-linear Effect of Complaints on a Company’s Market Value. 
Positive tradeoffs may emerge and generate an increase in market value even under a low level 
of complaint. Two mechanisms may underlie such an increase. First, market value increase is possible 
because company image is little exposed to severe damage. Consumers holding emotional bonds with 
a  company  may  tolerate  other  consumers’  bad  experiences  and  rationalize  it  as  less  problematic 
personally. Even calculative consumers find no reason to stop buying from a seller and are not willing 
to afford the switching costs to move to a new seller (R. Lee & Romaniuk, 2009). From the stock Consumer Complaints and Company Market Value   253 
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market perspective, as long as consumers are willing to continue buying from a company, there is no 
negative  effect  on  market  analyst  reports  and  consequently  on  stock  prices.  This  allows  for  the 
company to even increase its market value under a low level of complaints.    
The second mechanism to operate in positive tradeoffs is a company’s cost reduction rationale 
that surpasses the benefits of reducing the overall damage of a low complaint level. First, neglecting 
certain complaints may be justified by the high costs of solving the root of a problem. Companies 
often worry just about measuring customer satisfaction and forget to assess the customer lifetime value 
(CLV). The CLV allows for an accurate evaluation over time whether a client provided revenues that 
exceed, by an adequate margin, the marketing, sales and customer service costs spent in relation to this 
particular  customer  (P.  D.  Berger  et  al.,  2006;  Venkatesan  &  Kumar,  2004).  Considering  how 
heterogeneous individuals are, managing negative word of mouth of complaints will be efficient when 
it is possible to attract and retain customers who offer high potential profitability (Niraj, Grupta, & 
Narasimhan, 2001). It is often necessary to address each customer’s specific complaints to reduce 
negative word of mouth. Based on the concept of tradeoffs and client profitability, reducing negative 
word of mouth that are already at low levels can mean significant increases in costs, due mainly to the 
high  level  of  personalization  or  customization  of  services,  which  can  compromise  a  company’s 
profitability and consequently its market value.  
Second,  neglecting  extremely  demanding  customers  may  be  justified  by  the  high  costs  of 
satisfying them. An increase in complaint level can originate from a base of consumers who offer little 
potential profitability and became dissatisfied due to a price increase or simply reducing the package 
of services and customizations available (Niraj et al., 2001). Complaints may emerge when customer 
satisfaction is dependent on product or service customization. Anderson, Fornell and Rust (1997) 
argue that there is incompatibility between customer satisfaction and company market value when it is 
costly to provide high levels of customization. Under these circumstances, an increase in complaint 
level may not necessarily be harmful to company market value, given the savings generated by not 
fulfilling the specific needs of these customers. In the effort to reduce significant negative effects, it is 
important  to  verify  whether  the  company,  in  promoting  products  and  services,  has  not  created 
excessive  expectations  that  will  lead  to  future  dissatisfaction  (Osinga  et  al.,  2011).  Consumers 
perceive  the  product  value  on  the  basis  of  what  the  company’s  promises  are,  thereby  seeking 
satisfaction over the long term.   
Negative tradeoffs, on the other hand, follow a stream of research that focuses on the motives 
that lead consumers to make their voice loud and spread their bad experience. Very satisfied or very 
dissatisfied customers are more likely to initiate positive or negative word of mouth (Anderson, 1998; 
Matos & Rossi, 2008). Previous studies, based on psychological aspects, begin with a companies’ 
mistakes and investigate how they cause consumers’ negative emotions, which are antecedents to 
dissatisfaction responses (Romani et al., 2012; Sjödin, 2008). In Dixon, Freeman and Toman (2010), 
just  23%  of  customers  who  had  a  positive  experience  related  to  a  product  or  service  sent  this 
information  to  10  or  more  people.  On  the  other  hand,  48%  of  customers  who  had  a  negative 
experience  sent  this  information  to  10  or  more  people.  Heskett,  Jones,  Loveman,  Sasser  and 
Schlesinger (1994) developed the concept of the terrorist customer who can significantly affect a 
company’s profitability. This type of customer is so dissatisfied with the quality of a service provided 
that she spreads negative information whenever the opportunity arises and is able to reach hundreds of 
other potential customers through the internet (Santos & Fernandes, 2011). 
Two mechanisms underlie the negative tradeoff. First, corporate and brand reputation – i.e. 
defined  by  how  consumers  perceive  a  company  or  a  brand  –  affect  company’s  market  value 
(Grönroos, 1984). There is a negative consumer reaction when the company or its employees deliver a 
poor service or product (Harris & Ogbonna, 2013; McColl-Kennedy, Sparks, & Nguyen, 2011; Santos 
& Fernandes, 2008). Consumers that receive any negative information from a third-party source about 
a product or service tend to have lower attitudes towards the company, especially when compared to 
those  receiving  no  information  at  all  (Matos  &  Veiga,  2005).  A  brand  with  a  high  number  of 
complaints indicates a low level of satisfaction with a company’s offering, diminishing the capacity to 
attract and retain customers and consequently, impacting the company’s future expected cash flow D. P. Claro, A. F. G. R. Fragoso, S. A. Laban Neto, P. B. de O. Claro  254 
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(Luo, 2007). By raising their client retention level by 1%, a company is able to increase market value 
by 3% to 7% (Gupta, Lehman, & Stuart, 2004). Also, the customer base and their level of satisfaction 
may be considered as a company’s intangible assets (Rust et al., 2004).  
Complaints damage intangible assets, because they increase the costs of attracting and retaining 
customers (Anderson et al., 2004), and also diminish a company’s ability to maintain revenue and 
garner repeat consumers (Luo, 2007), reducing customer tolerance toward price increases (Chevalier 
&  Mayzlin,  2006).  Complaints  also  increase  the  risks  associated  with  future  cash  flow.  Positive 
customer  satisfaction  gives  companies  greater  protection  from  external  shocks  and/or  competitor 
maneuvers reducing cash flow loss (Gruca & Rego, 2005). Such positive effects reduce a company’s 
cost  of  capital.  Smith,  Smith  and  Kun  (2010)  and  Andreassen  and  Lindestad  (1998)  found  that 
reputation is positively correlated with satisfaction and brand loyalty. A company’s market value may 
be damaged by a high complaint level. 
Second,  the  mechanism  of  negative  tradeoffs  is  also  associated  with  a  speedy  and  intense 
diffusion over the social networks. There has been a rapid spread of broadband internet connections 
and a proliferation of blogs, interactive websites and multiuse cell phones (Santos & Fernandes, 2011). 
The negative response of a bad experience intensifies and spreads quickly over this high level of 
interconnectedness  among  consumers  (Goldenberg  et  al.,  2009).  This  interconnectedness  allows 
consumers to exert a growing influence on brand reputation. In the past, consumers expressed their 
perceptions of brands by talking with friends or relatives; nowadays consumers use internet sites to 
disseminate their positive and negative experiences (Ward & Ostron, 2006). Consumers also have 
control over the wide variety of media available, including the option to act as an online referral (De 
Bruyn & Lilien, 2008). They are prone to accept information about a brand when the origin is another 
consumer  that  might  be  friend  or  an  unbiased  informant,  and  consequently  are  likely  to  accept 
information about the product (Dichter, 1966).  
The central hypothesis of our study thus posits a non-linear effect of complaints on a company’s 
market value. Low levels of complaints are positive for a company’s market value because of the 
positive  tradeoffs.  Not  incurring  costs  and  investments  necessary  to  further  reduce  these  levels 
compensate for the impact of complaints. However after a certain level, as complaints increase and are 
increasingly and more rapidly spread, there are greater negative effects on customer satisfaction and 
loyalty as well as reputation and brand value, reducing future cash flow and increasing cash-flow risk. 
Thus, we can enunciate the central hypothesis of our study: 
Hypothesis: Complaints have a negative, non-linear effect on company market value: at low 
levels, positive tradeoffs occur which increase a company’s market value and as  complaint 
grows  beyond  a  critical  level,  its  effect  on  company  market  value  becomes  increasingly 
negative. 
 
 
Method  
 
 
We collected data from cell phone service providers in Brazil. The cell phone market reached 
136 phones per 100 inhabitant in December 2013 and has doubled in size over the past five years 
according to ANATEL (the National Telecommunication Regulatory Agency). Quarterly data from 
1Q/2005 to 2Q/2013 was collected from the three leaders in the cell phone industry, giving a total 
sample size of 102 measurements. Another cell phone service provider that operates in this market 
could not be included in this study because its headquarters is overseas and the financial data for the 
local operation is not publicly available. According to ANATEL, the three selected companies at the 
end of 2013 represented 72.4% of the Brazilian market, which provides an interesting setting to study 
complaints.   
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Study variables 
 
The dependent variable for the company market value was estimated based on Tobin’s Q Ratio. 
This  Q  Ratio  has  been  used  in  marketing  literature  in  studies  related  to  brand  equity  (Simon  & 
Sullivan, 1993), service evaluation (Fang et al., 2008) and customer satisfaction (Anderson et al., 
2004). We followed the method proposed by Chung and Pruitt (1994) to calculate the ratio. Formally, 
we measure Tobin’s Q Ratio as follows: 
    
                                      
                 
 
(1) 
where total asset value and liabilities are drawn from the balance sheet of the company. The share 
market price at a determined moment in time is an important component of the formula. To reduce the 
volatility of a single measurement of share price, R. P. Lee and Grewal (2004) recommend that the 
average share price of previous periods be used at the time that Tobin’s Q Ratio is calculated. In our 
study we used a quarterly average, where the average is the closing price for each month within the 
quarter based on the historical data drawn from BM&F Bovespa (the Brazilian Stock Market).  
Complaints  were  collected  and  analyzed  according  to  Singh’s  protocol  (1988).  Singh  and 
Wilkes (1996) found evidence that complaints to third parties are a solid objective measure because it 
comes after any kind of previous complaint to either the company or family and friends. Previous 
study has employed complaints to third parties as a measure to study consumer dissatisfaction (Ruyter 
& Brack, 1993). The complaint type made to a regulatory agency denotes a serious issue and high 
degree of frustration with the bad experience with the product or service (Cronin & Fox, 2010). We 
draw from the ANATEL records to compute the independent variable, which account for the relative 
number of complaints for each company in the given quarter. The complaint variable also accounts for 
possible  differences  in  complaint  volume  due  to  customer  base size.  For the  non-linear  effect  of 
complaint we employed a squared variable.  
According  to  Shaver  (1998),  to  capture  the  effects  of  a  particular  variable  on  company 
performance it is important to include control variables. Companies eventually face random errors 
when  making  decisions.  We  therefore  included  three  control  variables  that  affect  a  company’s 
performance. The first is the level of financial debt or leverage, which has been used in various studies 
related to corporate finance (P. G. Berger & Ofek, 1995). A company’s total debt divided by the value 
of all of its shares is used as a measurement of a company’s debt situation. The second is the stock 
market index that considers the variation in return offered by this segment of the market which in 
turn is reflected in stock prices. This index also reflects any variations in country risk as well as risk 
free levels that can also affect stock prices. The Ibovespa Index is included as a control, because it is 
the most important average performance indicator for stocks on the Brazilian stock market. The third 
is the customer base size which was considered a control variable for company size. Some previous 
studies that used Tobin’s Q Ratio also used company size as a control variable (Fang et al., 2008; 
Sorescu & Spanjol, 2008).  
 
 
Results 
 
 
The model estimation followed the balanced panel structure of our data that contains time series 
of observations for three companies in a multiple, cross-sectional method. This requires attention to 
several estimation issues (Gujarati, 2003). First, serial correlation of Tobin’s Q can be problematic 
because  it  may  bias  parameter  estimates.  In  our  sample,  a  panel  Durbin-Watson  statistic  was 
calculated for the panel data and no significant autocorrelation was observed (p<0.05). To control for 
any unobserved firm heterogeneity, we included control variables that account for firm-specific effects 
in  the  model.  Second,  we  conducted a  Hausman  specification test  and  found  it  significant (1.28, D. P. Claro, A. F. G. R. Fragoso, S. A. Laban Neto, P. B. de O. Claro  256 
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p<0.05), which indicates that a random effects treatment of unobserved heterogeneity is not tenable. 
This  test  assessed  non-observed  effects  that  are  related  to  factors  intrinsic  to  the  cross-sectional 
method, which may vary over time. These effects may include each company’s management model, 
management ability or cultural aspects. The Hausman test allow us to consider that these non-observed 
variables do not affect the dependent variable under analysis. Therefore, we adopt the two-way, fixed-
effects panel regression model that allows using within group (i.e. companies) regression estimators.  
Consistent with our central hypothesis, we specify a quadratic parameter of complaint to assess 
the non-linear impact on company market value. We expect that complaints begin to decrease market 
value only after a critical level, and thus we anticipate that the linear effect will be significantly 
positive  and  that  the  quadratic  effect  will  be  significantly  negative.  If  both  effects  are  negative, 
complaints decrease market value at all levels of complaints. Table 1 presents the results obtained for 
the proposed model, where Tobin’s Q Ratio is a dependent variable and complaint is the independent 
variable. The quadratic variable and the control variables are also included. Residual plots of the 
estimation presented a random pattern as expected.    
The  results  confirm  the  proposed  central  hypothesis.  The  significant  negative  effect  of  the 
square of the complaint variable (β= -1.08; p<0.01) indicates that the negative effects of complaints on 
company market value are not linear and do indeed decrease market value only when higher levels are 
reached. As expected, the significant positive result for the linear term (β =1.39; p<0.01) indicates that 
at low levels the impact of an increase in complaint is positive for a company’s market value.  
 
Table 1 
 
Results of Statistical Analysis  
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q         b         β  Std_Error  p-value 
Intercept  -  1.18  -  0.00  (-1.05)  0.112 
Complaints 
 
11.18** 
 
0.41**  (-6.25)  0.001 
(Complaints)
2  -  11.49**  -  0.13**  (-9.15)  0.010 
Control Variables 
            Customer Base Size  -  0.01**  -    0.49**  (-0.01)  0.000 
Company´s Leverage 
 
0.88* 
 
  0.17*  (-0.82)  0.042 
Stock Market Index 
 
0.01** 
 
  0.21**  (-0.01)  0.009 
R² 
 
0.388 
        F-Statistics  
 
11.9** 
        Degrees of Freedom     (5, 94)             
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. β: standardized coefficient. 
All control variables present statistically significant results. For company size (their customer 
base), the coefficient sign was negative, contrary to the results of past research done in other contexts 
(Fang et al., 2008; Sorescu & Spanjol, 2008). One might suggest that the high rate of market growth 
during the study period could have influenced the analysis. In order to meet the needs of an ever 
growing customer base in the cell phone service industry, constant investments in infrastructure are 
necessary to guarantee access to service provider networks for all customers (Fleury & Fleury, 2003). 
Thus, the result of these investments is the fast growth in the assets of each of these companies which, 
according to the model proposed by Chung and Pruitt (1994), can negatively affect Tobin’s Q Ratio 
when share prices do not accompany this same accelerated rhythm. Such issues may be addressed in 
future studies. The other control variables, company’s leverage and stock market index, were positive 
as expected.  Consumer Complaints and Company Market Value   257 
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Figure  2  illustrates  the  results  in  a  scatter  plot  and  a  graph  plotting  complaints  against 
company’s market value (Tobin’s Q Ratio) and shows the quadratic effect. The sample, model and 
period considered in this study indicates a break point of 0.49 complaints per thousand consumers in a 
company’s customer base. The effects on market value become increasingly negative when trying to 
make reductions to move below this level due to the negative tradeoffs – in terms of company market 
value vs. complaints. 
 
Figure 2. Scatter Plot and Estimated Function for Complaint Level and Company Market Value. 
Figure 3 provides a descriptive analysis of the break point in our sample. Comparing the break 
point determined by the estimated coefficients of our study with the individual service provider data, 
we find that company B on average operated close to this break point level of complaints, indicating 
an effective way to manage this issue. Company C, on the other hand, operated most of the time at 
levels  below  the  threshold,  suggesting,  according  to  our  model,  idle  capacity  or  excessive 
customization  for  the  consumer,  which  can  negatively  affect  market  value.  Finally  company  A, 
beginning in 2007, showed great variability in its complaint level and had relatively high points in 
relation to  the  estimated break  point, indicating  possible  growing  dissatisfaction  with  the  brand’s 
reputation and decreased customer loyalty. 
 
Figure 3. Level of Negative Word of Mouth and the Estimated Optimal Level. 
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Final Considerations and Implications  
 
 
The aim of this study is to test a non-linear effect of complaint on company market value. The 
results support the posited hypothesis, with relevant implications for marketing practitioners as well as 
researchers.  Previous  studies  in  marketing  showed  that  complaint  affects  marketing  program 
effectiveness  (e.g.  Cronin  &  Fox,  2010;  Tax,  Brown,  &  Chandrashekaran,  1998).  Our  study 
contributes  to  this  stream  of  research  by  providing  a  negative  vs.  positive  tradeoff  rationale  and 
empirical evidence that it can be productive to reduce the complaint level to certain break point level. 
The monitoring complaint levels become very important to the process of planning and executing 
marketing programs and meeting budgets requirements.  
Previous  studies  have  shown  that  poor  complaint  management  has  a  detrimental  effect  on 
customer satisfaction (Bitner, Booms, & Tetreault, 1990; Dixon et al., 2010). Our study contributes to 
the understanding of the mechanisms that allow companies to weigh the pros and cons of reducing 
complaints filed with a public agency to a very low level. The evidence shown in this paper suggests 
that companies can tolerate a certain level of complaint with no loss in market value. It is critical to 
allocate resources to keep the level of complaints close to the break point so that the spread of negative 
information has no affect on performance. This is the opposite of what managers tend to do: managers 
use complaint rates as an indicator for consumer satisfaction and assume that if rates are very low, 
overall market value increases. Our findings provide important guidance for marketing practitioners 
especially in relation to the process of planning, controlling and executing marketing activities in a 
context of a highly competitive and relatively homogeneous value proposition.  
The  managerial  implications  of  our  study  fall  into  two  main  issues.  First,  measuring  and 
monitoring the number of complaints are critical tasks for marketing departments, especially regarding 
complaints made to third parties, such as regulatory agencies. Closely assessing the level of such 
potential negative word of mouth and making an effort to handle consumer response may increase 
loyalty  and  customer  satisfaction  after  a  successful  failure  recovery  (Santos  &  Fernandes,  2008; 
Webster & Sundaram, 1998). Our results indicate the existence of a break point: trying to reduce 
complaints to very low levels will negatively affect a company’s market value, due to low detrimental 
image exposure and excessive handling costs that are not offset by the positive cash flow generated. 
However,  letting  the  level  of  complaints  grow  beyond  the  break  point  will  negatively  impact  a 
company’s  market  value.  This  requires  managers  to  make  an  effort  to  reduce  the  number  of 
complaints. It thus becomes important for every company, in the light of their specific contextual 
conditions, to use and improve this model based on the best information and data available.  
A second managerial issue is related to the uncontrollable dynamics of social networks. It is 
hard to control everything that is said about products and services, particularly, in terms of online 
communication.  There  is  a  daily  need  for  marketing  departments  to  monitor  blogs,  social 
communities, and public and private complaint channels. Such monitoring will help managers identify 
opportunities and important duties  related to managing customer satisfaction level and reduce the 
dissemination of negative viral information about the company’s offerings (Godes & Mayzlin, 2004). 
Our research has some limitations and offers indications for future research. The results may be 
generalized with caution due to the particular market characteristics of the cell phone industry in 
Brazil  as  well  as  the  period  examined.  Further  studies  can  focus  on  other  sectors,  countries  and 
periods.  We  assumed  a  continuous  U-shape  function  that  one  may  think  that  the  increase  in  the 
number of complaints is a proxy for the increase in company value. This discontinuous effect of 
complaint should receive attention in future non-linear research. Our rationale of positive and negative 
tradeoffs  may  take  different  mechanisms  in  different  contexts.  Future  studies  may  look  at  other 
consumer and company issues to deepen the understanding of complaint effects. Future studies may 
also look into the content of such complaints. It would be of interest to qualify the different type of 
complaints that exist by source, cause, intensity and offer type, among others. Based on Bitner, Booms 
and  Tetreault  (1990)  it  would  be  valid,  if  data  is  available,  to  segregate  the  different  types  of Consumer Complaints and Company Market Value   259 
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complaints and their respective impacts on company market value. Following up on this theme, there 
is a need to qualify complaints in relation to consumers’ emotions and behavior. According to Sjödin 
(2008), anger is the negative emotion that leads consumers to engage in negative word of mouth, 
which is detrimental to the process of creating brand and company value. Future studies combining 
behavioral psychology and marketing can further complement this work by identifying which specific 
types of mechanisms underlie these negative emotions (McColl-Kennedy et al., 2011; Romani et al., 
2012).  
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